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Abstract
 
This thesis examines the impact of Supreme Court de
 
cisions affecting public administration immunity and explains
 
their effect on the contemporary administrative state. In
 
addition, it will explore alternative methods for protecting
 
citizens' rights from official malfeasance.
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Chapter 1
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Modern government bureaucracies are larger and more
 
powerful than at any time in history. The President, members
 
of Congress, and private citizens have found that holding
 
the bureaucracy and its employees accountable for its actions
 
has become increasingly more difficult. The image, however,
 
of unresponsive bureaucrats and an all-powerful bureaucracy
 
is also somewhat misleading. The President, the Congress,
 
and private citizens all have methods at their disposal for
 
ensuring that the public service serves the public.
 
This thesis will analyze the impact of Supreme Court
 
decisions affecting public administration immunity and ex
 
plain their effect on the contemporary administrative state.
 
In addition, it will explore alternative methods for protec
 
ting citizens' rights from official malfeasance.
 
President Nixon's domination of the federal welfare
 
bureaucracy and the considerable changes he wrought in wel~
 
fare policy illustrate the power of the President to influ
 
ence the bureaucracy.^ Presidential appointments to civil
 
service positions are another example of executive control
 
over the federal bureaucracy. The Congress, through control
 
of the budgetary process, has possibly the greatest potential
 
accountability mechanism of all at its disposal. The private
 
citizen, however, has no comparable means at his disposal.
 
The individual wronged by the action of a certain public
 
official or agency had, until the last two decades, little
 
 recourse. However, recent developments concerning the civil
 
liability of public employees has given the individual the
 
right to pursue complaints in the courts.
 
The demand for increased accountability among public
 
officials and employees has been influenced by two important
 
2 —• j-i_ _ — ~-c „4.^otive State
developments. First, the rise of the Administra
 
ocratic
has had profound consequences for citizens in dem
 
State has
nations.^ The rapid growth of the Administrative
 
ration of
resulted in an increase in the governmental penet
 
ddition.
the economic and social life of the nation. In a
 
this growth in governmental activity has increased to a point
 
employees
where the degree of discretion permitted government 

ay perform
has been expanded in order that these employees m
 
their duties.
 
experts in
Many civil servants today are considered
 
ided by a
their field, functionaries whose decisions are gu
 
ordinary
specialized knowledge often not available to the
 
technology
citizen.^ Moreover, in an age of ever increasing
 
rded public
and specialization, the degree of discretion affo
 
reased
officials has presented greater arguments for inc
 
accountability mechanisms for these officials. Elected
 
wledge of

.s must also depend on the specialized kno
 
1 servant is
the modern civil servant. Therefore, todays civi
 
tor of public
not simply the executor but many times the initia
 
policy. ^
 
used the
During the past 50 years the Congress has
 
Legislative Veto in its efforts to exert control and
 
 influence over federal agencies, as well as the Executive
 
Branch of government. Simply stated, the veto enabled Con
 
gress to delegate authority to the bureaucracy while still
 
being able to veto decisions or policies made by 1:he bureau
 
cracy when Congress felt it necessary. However, the supreme
 
CoUrt, in Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) V.
 
5 ^ . ■ .■■ ■ ' ■ . ! ■ 
Chadha, (1983) struck down the legislative veto in a de 
cision which stunned Congress. 
In the main, the Court's decision will foirce Congress 
to find alternative devices for holding the bureaucracy 
accountable to it. Undoubtedly, the Congress wilj. find new 
ways. This issue demonstrates, however, that in the modern 
administrative state the demands for accountability are end 
less, whether by the President,Congress, or an individual 
citizen.,, ■ 
The rise of the Administrative State and the conse 
quent increase in the degree of discretion afforded public 
officials has left individual citizens with but one place to 
turn when wronged by government employees or policy of the 
courts. According to Rosenbloom; "allowing aggrieved 
citizens to sue governmental officials affords some measure 
of protection against the wrongful action of administrators 
and provides the citizen with a kind of 'last ditch' defense 
against the administrative state." However, this was not 
always possible. Public officials and administrators have 
traditionally enjoyed a variety of types of immunity. Indeed, 
the Constitution provides federal legislators with "privileged 
  
; ■ . ; • ; ■ " ' -I 4 ' ■ 
speech" by making them absolutely iininune from suits for
 
damages caused by their remarks in any speech or I debate in
 
either House, and the Supreme Court has afforded;similar
 
protections to judges and public prosecutors. As the ad­
ministratiye state expanded, the question arose wljiether the
 
discretionary actions of high ranking administrative officials
 
ought hot to be similarly protected. The recent c^ecisions of
 
the courts appear to suggest not. I
 
; development OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY |
 
A definite trend away from administrative officials
 
traditional protection of absolute immunity, which was estab
 
lished by the supreme Courts decision in Spaldinq y. Vilas
 
(1896),^ and toward a more qualified immunity began to emerge
 
in the 1960's. Recent decisions of the Supreme Ccjurt have
 
seen major changes in the personal liability of administrators
 
for the decisiohs and policies they formulate. A(^inistrators
 
at all levels of government in the United States are faced
 
with a growing number of personal liability lawsuits. The
 
notion that those working for the sovereign can "do no wrong"
 
as is "true" of the sovereign, has been called into question
 
during the past decades. Moreover, the range of siubject mat
 
ter which has come to be litigated is revolutionary in that
 
adlninistrative decisions which seem quite routine at first
 
glance are now reviewed in court. |
 
The 1970's witnessed a series of attacks oh the
 
doctrine of absolute immunity» These Changes came about as
 
a result of decisions at both federal and state Supreme Court
 
levels and through decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals.
 
Beginning with Bivens v« Six Unknown, Named Federal Narcotics
 
Agents (1971), and culminating with the decision in Butz v.
 
Economon (1978), an increasing trend towards the personal
 
liability of public officials has been established.
 
In Bivens, the Supreme Court ruled that a citizen
 
could sue an employee-of the federal government for monetary
 
damages resulting from a violation of his constitutional
 
rights. This was the first reassessment of the precedents
 
set in Spalding v. Vilas (1896) and Barr v. Mateo (1959)
 
which recognized the immunity of administrative officials.
 
Moreover, in several cases following Bivens, the Court sub
 
stantially refined the nature of administrators' immunity.
 
In Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974), the Supreme Court re­
jected the concept of absolute administrative immunity, which
 
had prevailed since 1896, in favor of the notion of "quali
 
fied" immunity. Whether such an immunity existed depended on
 
the judiciary's view of the reasonableness of the official's
 
judgment and the extent to which the action was taken in
 
good faith.
 
The Supreme Court, in Wood v. Strickland (.1975),
 
adopted a new standard for judging the scope of administra
 
tors' immunity. Here, the Court ruled that public adminis
 
trators are not immune from liability for damages if they
 
"knew or reasonably should have known" that the action they
 
took would violate the constitutional rights of another
 
Together these cases set the stage for the decision in Butz
 
V. Economou.
 
The Supreme Courts decision in Butz v. Economou (1978)
 
dealt the final blow to the doctrine of absolute official im
 
munity for public administrators. In Butz, Arthur N. Economou
 
registered as a commodities futures trader with the Department
 
of Agriculture's (USDA) Commodity Exchange Authority (CEA).
 
The CEA was required by law to ensure that traders maintained
 
minimum capital balances and regularly reported their finan
 
cial status.
 
The CEA audited Economou's finances, and allegedly
 
found violations of the capital requirements. As a result
 
the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture issued an administra
 
tive complaint citing Economou for failure to maintain the
 
minimum capital balance. Furthermore, the complaint charged
 
that Economou had willfully violated regulations and directed
 
him to show cause why his registration should not be sus
 
pended or revoked. At this time the CEA released news of
 
the action to the press.
 
A second CEA audit showed additional failures on
 
Economou's part to maintain the minimum capital balances.
 
This resulted in an amended complaint.
 
Formal actions by the USDA furthered the attempt to
 
stop Economou's trading activities. The USDA's chief hearing
 
examiner sustained the complaint in 1971, and the USDA s
 
judicial officer suspended Economou's registration for 90
 
days in 1973.^^
 
Economou appealed to the courts and the administra­
tive action was stopped. In 1974, the Second District U.S.
 
Court of Appeals overturned the suspension because the USDA
 
had proceeded against Economou without a customary warning
 
letter which might have led Economou to correct the financial
 
reserves problem.
 
Economou sued Butz and other USDA officials for de
 
priving him of his constitutional rights. In response to
 
Economou's suit, Butz and the other defendants claimed
 
official immunity.
 
The U.S. District Court dismissed Economou's claim.
 
Federal officials, according to the court, enjoy absolute
 
immunity for all discretionary acts carried out within the
 
scope of their authority.13 However, the U.S. Court of
 
Appeals held that executive officials do not have absolute
 
immunity. The court based its decision on the Civil Rights
 
Act of 1871.
 
In Butz, the Supreme Court formulated new policy
 
which "removed the protection from personal suit and
 
monetary damages which federal executives had enjoyed, saying
 
that federal officials and employees are not absolutely
 
immune from liability for injuries if they deprive others
 
14
 
of their constitutionally protected rights."
 
The succession of cases since Butz appears not only
 
to confirm, but also widen the base of federal officials
 
liability. Davis v. Passman (1979) held that the due pro
 
cess clause of the Fifth Amendment provided a remedy in
 
damages. Carlson v. Green (1980) held that the Eight
 
 Amendments cruel and nnusual punishment clause cotild also
 
serve as the basis for a civil suit for damages aaainst
 
federal officials. Despite the fact that one case in the
 
TO
 
circuit courts, Cruz v. Beto (1980), placed the burden of
 
proving a federal officials neglect or disregard :tor consti­
tional rights on those allegedly injured, the need to go to
 
court at all shows a radical departure from past policy.
 
The Supreme Courts' decision in Butz overruled the oft-

used doctrine of official immunity as applied to federal ad
 
ministrative officials. Today federal executives I can claim
 
only a "qualified immunity", rather than absolute;immunity,
 
"that immunity qualified by evidence attesting to'the exe 
cutive's good faith and reasonable belief in the constitu­
■ ■ ■ ■■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 19 • ■ '■ ■ ■ 
tionality or legality of his or her action." j 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOSS OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
 
Increased accountability of civil servant^ is cer
 
tainly desired, however, not everyone appears certain that it
 
is desirable in heving the courts formulate administrative
 
malpractice policy as the best way to accomplish this.
 
The Butz case has several negative implications
 
affecting the administration of public policy. First, the
 
defense of constitutional damage actions will be more diffi­
- 20 ■ ^
 
cult than in the past. Prior to Butz, the government
 
asserted absolute official immunity in defense of federal
 
officials whose discretionary acts were challenged as uncon
 
stitutional. However, to establish a claim to a qualified
 
 immunity, which is now the maximum protection available
 
generally to fecleral officials on constitutional claims,
 
the official must show that he acted reasonably and in
 
good faith. !
 
The subjective element of good faith often
 
involving state of mind of the official,|
 
may not be possible by affidayit, as was |
 
done prior to Butz, but instead will fre-i
 
• guently regviire a trial.^l
 
These trials will be more costly,, more time-consui|ning, a.nd
 
more difficult.
 
Secondly, the Butz case, as well as the succession
 
of section 1983 cases since Butz, have placed public officials
 
in a position of having to predict the constitutionality of
 
their discretionary actions. In sum, a governmental officer
 
is charged with foreseeing the unforeseeable despite apolo­
■ ■ ■ ■ '■ 22 ' getic statements of the Court to the contrary.
 
The decision in Butz has made the defense of consti
 
tutional damage actions more difficult. In addition, it has
 
forced public administrators to be wary when making decisions
 
involving their discretion. This may seriously hamper
 
officials in doihg their duty. The ultimate outcome may
 
well be that officials faced with the possibility|of having
 
to satisfy a future jury of the reasonableness and good faith
 
of their actions, will simply opt for the safest course of
 
action, rather than acting in a more vigorous manner, "unem^
 
■ ■ ■'23 ■" '• ' ■ ':barrassed by the fear of damage suits." The thteat of 
these suits skewing the proper functioning of government may 
be seen as frightening.^^ 
10 
The question must now be raised as to whoi should for
 
mulate administrative malpractice policy and what; goals should
 
be considered. The Supreme Court has played primiary policy
 
maker so far. However, in formulating administrative mal
 
practice policy, the Court is capturing a function of other
 
25 . .
 branches. In handling personal liability suits against
 
federal officials, the courts perform what is essentially a
 
legislative task. Justice Rehavquist argues against assuming
 
Congress' place
 
. . . because judgments that must be made
 
here involve many 'competing' policies,
 
goals, and priorities' that are not well
 
suited for evaluation by the Judicial
 
Branch.^®
 
Others, including David Rosenbioom, disagree, arguing that
 
"the Supreme Court has responded to the rise of the adminis
 
trative state by affording the individual greater defenses
 
27
 
against bureaucratic power."
 
Whether it is Congress or the Court which will ad
 
dress policy regarding administrative malpractice, what
 
policymakers should consider is of major concern. The
 
courts have basically attempted to protect citizehS from un
 
warranted official misconduct. In addition, two Other
 
basic goals have been,addressed. First, to compensate citi
 
zens injured by government officials who act illegally.
 
Secondly, to deter official misconduct by holding;officials
 
accountable in courts for damages.
 
The primary question about liability as policy is
 
"how courts can reconcile protection and compensation of
 
■ ' ■ '11 ■ ■ ■
 
28 ■ 
individuals with deterrence and with discretion." "The
 
courts must attempt to balance these goals. In the meantime,
 
alternative remedies to the courts fashioning administrative
 
malpractice policy have been suggested.
 
One of the most frequently mentioned methods of
 
ensuring federal government emplpyee accountability is the
 
use of the eiyil Service Reform Act of 1978. In addition,
 
amendmente tO;the Federal Tort Claims Act have been suggested
 
as an alternative method to private tort liability suits.
 
Both of these alternatives to pfficials' personal liability
 
would use the civil service system as an accountability
 
mechanism instead of the courts. It is argued that this
 
would accomplish two titiir^s. First, it would cut down on the
 
number of frivolous persohal liability Suits filed against
 
federal employees. Secondly, it would provide a more effec
 
tive and efficient standard for regulating employee conduct.
 
Other alternatives which have been suggested include
 
administrative malpractice insurance and risk management
 
strategies. So far, however, private liability insurance has
 
■ 29' 
been all but impossible to obtain. Risk management involves
 
isolating potential liability risks or activities which might
 
3Q .
 
lead to court suits. Government operations would be sur
 
veyed, identifying liability risks. This system has been
 
used by private enterprise but has not yet been tried by
 
either local, state, or federal governments.
 
In the recent past, the Supreme-Court has begun to
 
establish an administrative malpractice policy. This policy
 
 ■ '" -'V ■ ■ r2-'v 
has many supporters as \^ell as critic The Courts' actions are,
 
therefore^ still an issue of hot contention. At any rate,
 
"we have entered a nev/ era in which civil liability comprises
 
a major avenue to administrative responsibility, and awaits
 
the reconciliation of divergent goals in present mailpractice
 
policy. ■ 
Chapter Previews ^
 
, The tradition of administrator's immunity is based on a
 
series of court decisions which at first established and 
eventually broadened the concept of absolute administrative 
immunity. Chapter Two will examine the reasoning behind the 
concept of absolute immunity and the court decisions which it 
was based on. This chapter will also review the evolution of■ 
the theory of administrator's liability and the policy con 
siderations underlying that evolution. In addition, it will 
examine the rise of the administrative state and the conse 
quent changes brought about by this growth for citizens. 
A reexamination of the doctrine of absolute immunity 
began in the 1970's. Beginning with Bivens in 1971 and cul 
minating in the Butz decision in 1978 the concept of absolute 
immunity was replaced by the development of qualified im 
munity. Chapter'Three will'examine the demise of the theory 
of absolute administrative immunity and its replacement by a 
theory of qualified or limited immunity. 
Chapter Four will examine the implications of the loss 
of absolute immunity; for administrators, the public, and 
the functioning of the administrative state. Additionally, 
13 
it will examine possible alternatives to administrators'
 
libility as a means of ensuring administrative efficiency.
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 Chapter 2
 
INTRODUCTION
 
This chapter will review the evolution'of the theory
 
of administrative liability and immunity and the policy consid
 
erations underlying that evolution. Ihe legal heritage of
 
liability and immunity doctrine in the United States can be
 
traced to English Common law. Broadly stated, the doctrine
 
of official immunity rende^^s government officials "immune
 
from liability for their actions even though their con
 
duct, if performed in other contexts, would in itself
 
be unconstitutional or otherwise Contrary to criminal or civil
 
statute."^ This chapter demonstrates how the United States •
 
Supreme Court decisions up to 1970 affected public administra
 
tors' immunity, and explains their importance for the admin
 
istrative state.
 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
 
The rise of the administrative state has profound con­
. 2
 
sequences for the nature of citizens in democratxc nations.
 
One of the problems it presents concerns the actions available
 
to citizens who have been harmed by the decisions of adminis
 
trative officials. Traditionally, the actions of these offi
 
cials have been hidden from view by "absolute immunity." As
 
Frederick Mosher notes, "The accretion of specialization and
 
of technological and social complexity seems to be an irrever
 
sible trend, one that leads to increasing dependence upon the
 
protected, appointive public service, thrice removed from
 
■ ' 3' ■ direct democracy." In recent years, it is generally agreed
 
■'17
 
18 
that non-elected, non-polltically appointed officials have
 
4
 
grown increasingly powerful. The situation has reached the
 
point where many people feel that greater controls must be
 
imposed on these officials in order to make them more accoun
 
table to the public for their actions. According to Sayre,
 
the staffs of executive branch agencies have
 
come to exercise an important share of the ;
 
initiative, the formulation, the bargaining/
 
and the deciding in the process in which
 
governmental decisions are taken. They are
 
widely acknowledged to be experts as to the
 
facts upon which issues are to be settled;
 
they are often permitted to identify author
 
itatively the broad alternatives available
 
as solutions; and they frequently are allowed
 
to fix the vocabulary of the formal decision.
 
These powers are shared and used by the
 
career staffs in an environment of struggle
 
and competition for influence, but the rela
 
tively nev; fact to be noted with emphasis
 
is that others v;ho share the powers of de­
cision--the President, Congress, the poli
 
tical executives, the congressional com-

m.ittees and staffs, the interest groups,
 
the communications media-now rarely question
 
the legitimacy of the career staff spokes- ^
 
man as major participants in the competition.
 
Yet, as usually happens in the American political
 
model, a countervailing weight has emerged. While the shift
 
in pov/er from elective to administrative officials was be
 
coming more evident, the U. S. Supreme Court was reinter
 
preting traditional doctrines concerning administrators'
 
official immunity and as a result was developing some new
 
protections for citizens from arbitrary and protected admin
 
istrative caprice.
 
Although the steps taken thus far are modest, they
 
19 
aire not without significant consegusncss. Thsy contain with~
 
in thsiu ths concspt that th© public official can b© h©lci p©ir
 
sonally accountabl© to th© citiz©nry und©r c©rtain sp©cific
 
g
 
circumstanc©s.
 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND OFFICIAL LIABILITY
 
Th© doctrin© of. sov©r©ign immunity holds that th©
 
gov©rnm©nt cannot b© su©d for civil damages in th© abs©nc© of
 
its own consent. Th© doctrin© has its origin in English law.
 
However, the rationail© for the doctrine, in viev/ of th©
 
changes brought about by the administrative state, are quit©
 
perplexing. Why the doctrin© of sovereign immunity was
 
7
 
adapted to American law in the first place is quite puzzlxng.
 
In United States v. Lee (1882), the Supreme Court acknow
 
ledged that
 
...while the exemption of the United States
 
and of the several states from being_sub-_
 
jected as defendants to ordinary actions in
 
the courts has...repeatedly been asserted
 
here, the principle has never been dis
 
cussed or the reasons for it given, but it
 
has always been treated as an established
 
doctrine.
 
However, the Supreme Court also stated that no man in this
 
country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of
 
thB Ibw may sst the lav7 at defiance with impunity.
 
Considering the nature of the doctrine of sovereign
 
immunity/ it was only logical that the government should
 
surrender large portions of its immunity as it became more
 
involved in the citizen's everyday life. For example, as
 
20 
early as 1855 the federal goverhraent established the United
 
States Court of Claims and waived its immunity where contracts
 
were at issue. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946,
 
the federal government sacrificed even more of its immunity.
 
The importance of sovereign immunity has consequently been
 
substantially diminished over time. Thus, a citizen who is,
 
harmed by negligent governmental activity or governmental
 
breach of contract may now have some| recourse in court.
 
Traditionally, howevei", if a citizen attempted to sue
 
an administrative official, as ah individual, for v^rongs done
 
in connection with that official's employment rather than
 
atteriipting to sue the government itself, he would encounter
 
a different sitution. According to Davis,
 
The old common law, broadly viewed, was that
 
an agent was liable to a third party for his
 
torts, whether or not within the scope of
 
employment, and that as between principal

and agent, the ultimate liability rested
 
upon the agent, whether the tort was delib
 
erate or involved nothing more than
 
negligence.
 
According to this approach, a citizen could sue a public
 
official and recover damages for the public administrator's
 
torts. However, it contained two inherent problems. One
 
deals with the question of when and why administrative
 
officials are inutiUne from suits for civil damages; the other
 
concerns the issue of whether an individual can bring a suit
 
against a federal official for monetary damages for breach of
 
the individual's constitutional rights.
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THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO ADMINISTRATORS' IM?4UNITY
 
Should citizens be allowed to sue public officials?
 
According to RosenbloOiti, allowing citizens such rights
 
"gives then a last ditch defense against the administrative
 
state. However, it is argued that this may not be the
 
most appropriate method for protecting citizens* constitu
 
tional rights and reducing administrative errors. It has
 
long been recognized that such suits could be used in a
 
harassing and frivolous manner. Many of these suxts are
 
filed on less than meritorious grounds. For example, the
 
attorney general has been sued in his individual capacity for
 
damages by a private school teacher dismissed from a school
 
V7hich indirectly received funding from the Law Enforcement ^
 
Assistance Administration. The President and certain mem
 
bers of the U.S. Senate have been sued for $20 million
 
dollars in damages for the alleged wrongful disposal of the
 
Panama Canal. Indeed, the Constitution provides federal
 
legislators v/ith "privileged speech" by making them abso
 
lutely immune from suits for damages caused by their remarks
 
in "any speech or debate in either House" and the U.S.
 
Supreme Court has afforded similar protections to judges and
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public prosecutors. As the administrative state developed, 
the question arose whether the discretionary actions of high 
ranking administrative officials ought not to be similarly 
■■ protected. 
In 1896, the issue was first addressed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Spalding v. Vilas. The decision in the C3se 
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clearly outlined where private citizens stood in regard to
 
suing a federal official. , The facts of the case are as
 
follows. United States Postmaster General Vilas had sent
 
a communication to several postmasters who were seeking a
 
salary increase and vrere represented by Spalding. It
 
allegedly placed Spalding "before the country as a common
 
swindler," and brought "him into public scandal, infamy and
 
disgrace and injured his business." The coirmunication also
 
made it clear that the postmasters did not ov7e Spalding,for
 
the services he had provided them. Spalding then Sought
 
damages in court. In its decision, the Supreme Court estab
 
lished the constitutional principle that;
 
In exercising the functions of his office the
 
head of an Executive Department, keeping
 
within the limits of his authority, should
 
not be under an apprehension that the motives
 
that control his official conduct may, at any
 
time, become the subject of inquiry in a
 
civil suit for damages. It would seriously
 
cripple the proper and effective administra
 
tion of public affairs as entrusted to the
 
executive branch of the government, if he
 
were subject to any such restraint.
 
With this ruling, federal department heads Were guaranteed
 
immunity from civil suits arising out of decisions they made
 
in their official capacity,:regardless of the motives that
 
may have influenced their behavior. The dangers inherent in
 
such a doctrine are clear. The opportunities for abuse and
 
misuse of pov;er would be greater with the federal official
 
iipmune from civil suit.
 
The Spalding decision may have been appropriate v;ith
 
the realities of power in the federal executive branch in
 
1896, but as the administrative state emerged in its modern
 
form, the Spalding decision is no longer logical. The ad
 
ministrative state today, 86 years after the Spalding de
 
cision, has changed s6 radically that the traditional idea
 
of admihistrators V. immuhity simply cannot deal X:^ith the
 
enormous power exercised by the federal executive branch.
 
The decisiori ignores the harm that could be done by the
 
pov7erful administrative'officials of this day and age.
 
Certainly, at the very least, the public needs pro
 
tection from officials, such as department heads, who are
 
acting in bad faith. However, restricting immunity to de
 
partment heads ignores the nature Of power in the administra
 
tive state. Although they wield considerable influence,
 
political executives do not control bureaucracies in any
 
simple sense. The modern bureaucracy is a large and complex
 
organization. Indeed, most observers agree that, "account
 
ability gets lost in the shuffle somexArhere in the middle
 
ranges of the bureaucracy."^^ This is partly the case, as
 
Weber explained, because "the 'political master' finds him
 
self in the position of the 'dilettante' who stands opposite
 
the 'expert,'facing the trained official who stands within
 
the mahagement of administration." In the United States,
 
however, there is a tendency for upper level career bureau
 
crats to have considerable authority and influence. More
 
over, this situation is compounded by the fact that politi
 
cal executives have a short tenure as Well as the absence of
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a "shadow government which would enable them to bOgxn
 
their jobs with intimate knowledge of the organizations they
 
are assigned to lead. Conseguently, when one argues that
 
civil suits would seriously inhibit administrators from ef~
 
fectively doing their job, then some provision for immunity
 
for lower rahking administrators would also be necessary.
 
In Barr v. Mateo (1959) the Supreme Court addressed
 
the question of immunity for lower ranking administration.
 
Barr, the acting director of the Federal Office of Rent
 
Stabilization, announced his intention to suspend two em
 
ployees for their part in a plan for utilizing agency funds
 
which would have ablowed employees to take terminal leave
 
payments in cash and then be rehired on a temporary, though
 
indefinite, basis. The plan was criticized in Congress as
 
"an unjustifiable raid on the federal treasury," "a new rac­
■ ■ 21 
ket," and as involving "criminal action." The employees
 
sought damages against Barr for defamation. The court was
 
unable to formulate a majority opinion. In the end, four
 
justices agreed with Justice HarIan, whose grandfather had
 
written the court's opinion on Spalding. HarIan stated.
 
We are Called upon in this case to weigh in a
 
particular context two considerations which
 
now and again come into sharp conflict - on
 
the one hand, the protection of the individual
 
citizen against pecuniary damage caused by
 
oppressive or malicious action on the part of
 
officials of the Federal Government, and on
 
the other, protection of the public interest
 
by shielding responsible governmental .
 
officers against the harrassment and the in
 
evitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded
 
damage suits brought on account of action
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taken in the exercise of their official
 
resppnsibiritiep. It has been thought
 
important that officials of the govern
 
ment should be free to exercise their
 
duties unembarrassed by the fear of
 
damage suits in respect of acts done in
 
the course of those duties - suits v/hich
 
would consume time and energies which would
 
otherwise be devoted to governmental service
 
and the threat of which might appreciably
 
inhibit the administration of policies of
 
government." '
 
Harlan concluded,
 
To be sure, the occasions upon v/hich the
 
acts of a head of a department will be pro
 
tected by the privilege are doubtless far
 
greated than in the case of an officer
 
with less sweeping functions. But it is
 
because the higher the post, the broader
 
the range of responsibilities and duties,
 
and the wider the scope of discretion it
 
entails. It is not the title of his office
 
but the duties with which the particular
 
office sought to be made to respond in
 
damages is entrusted - the relation of the
 
act complained of to matters committed by
 
law to his control or supervision which
 
must provide the guide in delineating the
 
scope of the rule which clothes the official
 
acts of the executive officer with immunity
 
from civil defamation suits.22
 
If Spalding gave executive department heads immunity,
 
then Barr v. Mateo extended this immunity to those executive
 
officials below cabinet rank. However, the opinions of the
 
justices were quite diverse. Justice Black supported Harlan
 
on the ground that if restraints were to be placed on federal
 
employees' speech concerning how the government service
 
might be improved (whistle-blowing), these should be imposed
 
by congressional legislation rather than the various states
 
general libel laws. On the other hand, the Barr opinion was
 
condemned by Chief Justice Earl Warren who said that, "...it
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has not given the slightest consideration to the interest of
 
the individual who is defamed. It is a complete annihilation
 
■ ■23 ■of his interest." Justice Douglas concurred, statxng that 
he was less worried about governmental performance than about 
the rights of individuals. 
The Barr decision led to what is referred to as the 
Harlan Doctrine. The court had ruled, as did Chief Justice 
Marshall in 1804, 24 that liability can result when an execu 
tive clearly acts outside his authority; but the court de 
cided in this specific instance that the acting director had 
authority to issue the press release. The court, through the 
Barr case, developed the doctrine that no official must stand 
'■ ■ "■ ■ , ■ . ;. . . ■■, : 25 
a suit for an appropriate exercise of discretion. Many 
people considered this common sense. The federal executives 
exercise of discretionary authority can always create poten 
tial losses for some and gains for others. The executive 
then cannot be held responsible every time someone is harmed, 
however unfortunate the loss is. Subsequently, the Barr de­
dicsion was extended to a host of public administrators, in 
cluding a deputy U.S. marshal, a district director and col 
lection officer of the IRS, a claims representative of HEW, 
and a secret service agent. 
In conclusion, under the Spalding-Barr line of rea 
soning many of the acts of administrative officials were 
cloaked in immunity. A citizen who suffered harm at the 
hands of officials had no recourse in court. There was no 
21 
effort made to render the administrator directly accountable
 
to the citizen even when his actions were negligent. It
 
appeared that the rights of citizens ranked second to the
 
welfare of the administrative state. Although some cate
 
gories of public officials such as police were generally
 
exempt from this sort of immunity, abuses were inevitable
 
and the time came when the court was forced to readdress the
 
concept of absolute immunity.
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THE LOSS OF IMMUNITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
 
QUALIFIED: IMMUNITY
 
The Spalding-Barr doctrine granted immunity to most
 
.ic officials in the exercise of their official respons
 
ibilities. The Supreme Court, however, began a reexamina­
tion of this doctrine beginning with Bivens V. Six Unknown
 
Federal Narcotics Agents (1971). In its decision in this
 
case, "the court demonstrated its willingness to strike a
 
different balance between the protection of citizens from
 
ill-used administrative power and the functional require
 
ments of the administrative state.
 
Bivens sought $15,000 from each of the agents for
 
humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering caused when
 
they broke into his apartment, handcuffed him in the presence
 
of his fimily, threatened the entire family with arrest,
 
searched the apartment, used excessive force, and subjected
 
him to a "visual strip search" after taking him to a federal
 
courthouse. This action was accomplished in the absence of
 
a search or arrest warrant or probable cause.
 
Traditionally, Bivens' standard recourse would have
 
been to bring an action in tort in the state court, under pre
 
vailing state law, rather than to seek assignment of damages
 
jlation of his constitutional rights in the federal
 
forum.^ The Supreme Court, however, through Justice Brennan
 
had rejected the former approach because it failed to recog
 
nize the practical realities of the administrative state.
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Brennan stated:
 
Respondents seek to treat the relationship
 
between a citizen and a federal agent un
 
constitutionally exercising his authority as
 
no different from the relationship between
 
two private citizens. In so doing, they
 
ignore the fact that power, once granted,
 
does not disappear like a magic gift when
 
it is wrongfully used. An agent acting ­
albeit unconstitutionally - in the name of
 
the United States possesses far greater
 
capacity for harm than an individual
 
trespasser exercising no authority other
 
than lis own.3
 
As a consequence, the court held that the suit which Bivens
 
brought was tiis only realistic alternative. The right to
 
sue for monetary damages resulting from unconstitutional
 
treatment by public officials would not be confined to
 
alleged Fourth Amendments violations (freedom from unreason­
able search and seizure). Indeed, in Passman v. Davis
 
(1979) the cDurt subsequently extended these so-called con
 
stitutional tort or Bivens actions to violations of the
 
Fifth Amendment. Lower federal courts, also, have recog
 
nized employee personal liability for violations of the
 
First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Four­
-■ ' -4. ■ ■
 
teenth Amendments.
 
In Bivens the Supreme Court permitted monetary damages 
to be levied against federal employees. In addition, the 
Court of Appeals placed two conditions on discretionary 
authority, as specified in Barr, which officials must meet 
to avoid being prosecuted: good faith and reasonable action. 
Because the agents had failed to show probable cause, the 
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court ruled that they had injured Bivens' rights and there
 
fore had acted unreasonably and in bad faith.
 
While the Court established that the right to sue
 
for monetary damages resulting from unconstitutional treat
 
ment by public officials would not be confined to Fourth
 
Amendment cases, it did not examine the issue of whether the
 
narcotics agents in the Bivens case possessed immunity under
 
the Spalding-Barr doctrine. The Supreme Court left this to
 
the Court of Appeals. This Court ruled that the agents did
 
lack immunity
 
...because we do not agree that the agents were
 
alleged to be engaged in the performance of the
 
sort of 'discretionary' acts that require the
 
immunity"
 
and V-:-; "
 
...it wuld be a sorry state of affairs if an
 
officer had the 'discretion* to enter a
 
dwelling at 6:30 a.m., without a warrant
 
or probable cause, and make an arrest by
 
employing unreasonable force.^
 
The Appeals Court did, however, leave the door open for a
 
"good faith" defense based on the reasonableness of the
 
officials' actions at the time that they occurred.
 
The significance of the Supreme Court decisions, be
 
ginning with Bivens, lies primarily in its willingness to
 
strike a different balance between the desire to protect
 
citizens from arbitrary and capricious administrative power
 
and the functional requirements of the state. Two points
 
stand out. First, the immunity of federal officials was now
 
viewed in an entirely new dimension. As mentioned previously,
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the Spalding-Barr approach to determining discretionary
 
authority was hot sued in Bivens, instead, the Court used
 
the circumstances as a guide to determine whether the action
 
the official took was reasonable or was taken in a good
 
faith belief that probable cause existed. Second, the Court
 
implied that each right in the Constitution contains a remedy
 
for its violation, including a personal damage suit against
 
the official.^
 
In Bivens, the Court essentially established a new
 
doctrine instead of applying an empty remedy and attempting
 
to apply the muddled "discretionary authority" doctrine.
 
Therefore,violation of constitutional rights implicitly
 
p , ;, '
 
allows a court to levy damages against the violator.
 
LIMITED (GOOD FAITH) IMMUNITY
 
Tort liability of public officials refers to a poten­
ial, unreasonable interference with the interests or rights
 
of others. The great number of suits brought against
 
-ic officials in the 1970's prompted the courts to resur
 
rect a one hundred year old statute, the Civil Rights Act of
 
1871, as a way of confronting malpractice by government
 
officials.
 
Separate legal bases serve to hold state,local and
 
federal officials accountable. The Civil Rights Act of 1871
 
is the main legislative mandate for enforcing the liability
 
of state and local officials. The statute was passed in
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reaction to Ku Klux Klan terrorism following the Civil War.
 
The law was directed at state officials who tolerated terrorism
 
aimed against politically active blacks and their sympathizers.
 
The law, known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, and codified as Title
 
42, Section 1983 of the U.S. Code states,
 
Every person who, under color of any statute,
 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
 
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes
 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United
 
States or other person within the jurisdic
 
tion thereof to the deprivation of any
 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured
 
by the Constitution and laws, shall be
 
liable to the party injured in an action at
 
law, suit in equity, or other proper pro
 
ceeding for redress.10
 
; The Spalding-Barr precedent was reassessed by the
 
Supreme Court in Bivens. In subsequent cases. Section 1983
 
was used to further refine the nature of administrators' im
 
munity. In Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974) the Court rejected the
 
concept of "absolute" administrative immunity in favor of
 
the notion of "qualified" immunity. , In Wood v. Strickland
 
(1975) the Court created a new standard of immunity based on
 
the knov/ledge the Court feels administrators should have con
 
cerning the violation of a citizens constitutional rights.
 
The precedents set in these decisions set the stage for the
 
Court's most important decision concerning administrative
 
iramunite: Butz v. Economou (.1978).\
 
Scheuer v. Rhodes dealt with the liability of the
 
Governor of Ohio, officers of the Ohio national guard, and
 
the President of Kent State University for their alleged com­
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plicity in the killings of three Kent State University
 
students. Representatives of the estates of the three
 
students, fatally shot by i-he Ohio National Guard during
 
demonstrations at Kent State University against the United
 
States invasion of Cambodia in 1970, sought damages hgainst
 
Governor Rhodes and other officials. The officials, it was
 
alleged, had "acted either outside the scope of their respec
 
tive office or, if within the scope, acted in an arbitrary
 
manner, grossly abusing the lawful powers of the office.
 
In addressing the immunity question, a unanimous Court
 
held that:
 
...in varying scope, a qualified immunity is
 
available to officers of the executive branch
 
of government, the variation being dependent
 
upon the scope of discretion and responsibili
 
ties of the office and all the circiamstances
 
as they reasonably appeared at the time of the
 
action on which liability is sought to be
 
based. It is the existence of reasonable
 
grounds for the belief formed at the time and
 
in the light of all the circumstances, coupled
 
Witli good-faith belief, that affords a basis
 
for qualified immunity of executive officers
 
for acts performed in the course of official
 
misconduct.12
 
With this ruling, the court rejected the concept of
 
"absolute immunity for state employees, which had prevailed
 
since 1896, in favor of a new concept, "qualified" (good
 
faith) immunity. The question of whether an immunity existed
 
depended on the court's view of the reasonableness of the
 
official's judgment, and the extent to which the action was
 
taken in good faith. The Supreme Court, as it had done
 
earlier in Bivens, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals
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for a more detailed look at the application of this approach
 
to the specific set of facts involved.
 
The following year, in Wood v. Strickland (1975) the
 
Supreme Court adopted a new standard for judging the scope of
 
administrators' immunity. In sum, the Court decided that
 
should public administrators act without adequate knowledge
 
of the rights of others, they can be taken to federal court
 
and successfully sued for monetary damages.
 
In the case, Peggy Strickland, a 16-year old girl, and
 
two tenth grade classmates in Mena, Arkansas were charged with
 
"spiking" the punch served at a school gathering in violation
 
of a school regulation prohibiting the possession or use of
 
alcohol at such activities. The girls were questioned by a
 
teacher concerning their participation in the incident and
 
admitted their guilt. The teacher convinced the girls to
 
tell the school principal. The principal suspended the girls
 
for two weeks and referred the matter to the school board for
 
further consideration. At the next school board meeting the
 
principal and the teacher to whom the girls had confessed
 
recommended leniency. However, when it was discovered that
 
one of the girls had been involved in a similar incident
 
previously, the principal and the teacher withdrew their
 
recommendations for leniency and the Board decided to expel
 
the girls for the semester. Two of the girls, Strickland
 
and Virginia Grain, brought suit against the board members
 
under 42 U.S. Code 1983, asserting that, in the absence of a
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full-fledged hearing^ their cqristitutional right to due pro
 
cess had been abridged by their expulsion. "The girls sought
 
injunctiye relief, declaratory relief, and by amendnient to
 
their complaint, 25,000 dollars as compensatory damages for
 
each plaihtiff and 5,000 dollars punitive damages againSt each
 
'defendant." ■ ' 
^ V V the immunity issue, the majority of the
 
Supreme Court, through Justice White, held that both an
 
"objective" and "subjective" standard must be applied in
 
assessing the extent of official immunity:
 
The official himself must be acting sincerely
 
and with a belief that he is doing right, but
 
an act violating a student's constitutional
 
rights can be no more justified by ignorance
 
or disregard of settled, indisputable law on
 
the part of one entrusted with supervision of
 
students' daily lives than by the presence of
 
actual malice."
 
The court went on to hold that;
 
...a school board member is not immune from
 
liability for damages if he knew or reason
 
ably should have known that the action he
 
took within his sphere of. official responsi
 
bility would violate the constitutional
 
rights of the students affected, or if he took
 
the action with the malicious intention to
 
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights
 
or other injury to the student.
 
This created an identical standard of limited immunity
 
for all public officials from police officer to governor
 
(except for those who have absolute immunity, for example,
 
federal prosecutors), Katten has called Wood "the break­
ghrough in the effort to unravel the crazy guilt of immuni
 
ties. The Wood ruling, however, still has a degree of
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uncertainty to it. If there is good faith, then the deter
 
mination of immunity based on the official's knowledge that
 
deprivation of rights would occur to the injured party. The
 
important question is, how much knowledge is sufficient to
 
trigger the immunity shield? While some claim that Wood
 
"changes good faith from a subjective question of what did
 
the official believe at the time to the objective one of what
 
he should have known at the time," this question has yet to
 
be answered by the courts.
 
Justices Powell, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief
 
Justice Burger, dissented in the Court's creation of a new
 
standard of immunity, arguing that it was unreasonable for
 
the court to assess what the school board members "reasonably
 
should have known." Justice Powell focused on the portions
 
of the majority opinion which held that the school board mem
 
bers knew of the "settled, indisputable law" and "basic, un
 
questioned constitutional rights." Speaking of these stand
 
ards of knowledge that the majority established as a predicate
 
to immunity. Justice Powell noted: "Presumably these are in
 
tended to mean the same thing, although the meaning of neither
 
phrase is likely to be self-evident to constitutional scholars
 
- much less the average school board member. One need only
 
look to the decisions of the court - to our reversals, our re
 
cognition of evolving concepts, and the five-to-four splits ­
to recognize the hazards of even informed prophecy as to what
 
are 'unquestioned constitutional rights.'" Citing Goss v.
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Lopez, where the court extended due process safeguards to
 
temporary suspensions of students from public schools, Jus
 
tice Powell further noted that "most lawyers and judges wbuld
 
have thought, prior to that decision, that the law to the
 
contrary was settled, indisputable, and unquestioned."
 
In spite of the tremendous amount of dissent and
 
argument concerning the Scheuer and Wood decisions, the im
 
portance of this new standard for administrators' immunity ,
 
would be hard to overstate. It established a new balance be
 
tween the needs of the individual and those of the adminis
 
trators, because it forces the administrator to be aware of
 
the fact that the constitutional and legal rights of private
 
individuals must be considered whenever the administrator acts,
 
According to Rosenbloom,
 
...the Wood standard goes a long way towards
 
guaranteeing that public officials will have
 
a more personal concern in the decisions
 
they make, which in theory, will force them
 
to avoid engaging in arbitrary unconstitu
 
tional actions vis-a-vis members of the
 
general public.
 
At the same time, however, the standard appears to be defined
 
well enough to prohibit a rash of unfounded lawsuits against
 
public officials.
 
The Wood approach is designed to give individual
 
citizens a constitutional vehicle for assuring administrative
 
competence through a form" of direct accountability, without
 
keeping the administrative state from functioning adequately.
 
In Barr, Justice Brennan asked, "Where does healthy adminis­
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trative frankness and boldness shade into bureaucratic tyr­
anny?"^° In Wood, the majority answered, where administra
 
tive officials act with malice or in the absence of knowledge
 
they should have; that is, where their inadequate knowledge
 
directly infringes upon the well-established rights of
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private individuals.
 
The Wood decision left open the possibility that the
 
standard for the application of immunity it set forth might
 
be confined to school board members, rather than applied to
 
all administrative officials. However, in subsequent cases,
 
the Court applied the same standard as in Wood to the super
 
intendent of a state hospital (O'Connor v. Donaldson, 1975)
 
and to prison administrators (Procunier v. Navarette, 1978).
 
In O'Connor, Donaldson was civilly committed as a
 
mental patient in a Florida state hospital in accordance with
 
Florida statutory provisions governing involuntary civil com
 
mitment. Donaldson remained there for 15 years, constantly
 
seeking his release, arguing that he was dangerous to no one,
 
was not mentally ill, and that even if he were dangerous or
 
mentally ill, he was not receiving any type of treatment for
 
these conditions. Donaldson sued O'Connor under 42 U.S. Code
 
1983 charging that O'Connor, the superintendant of the
 
hospital, had intentionally and maliciously deprived him of
 
his constitutional right to liberty. At the trial, evidence
 
showed that Donaldson was not dangerous to others, hot
 
mentally ill and was not receiving treatment for his supposed
 
illnesses. O'Connor's defense was predicated on a good faith
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immunity from damages inasmuch as he believed the state
 
statute validly authorized indefinite custodial confinement
 
of the mentally ill even if they were not given treatment.
 
Th0 judge found 0'Gonnpr guiIty and awarded Donaldson $38,500
 
compensatory damages and $10,000 punitive damages. ThO court
 
•of appeals decision predicated O'Connor's liability on the
 
constitutional impermissibility of keeping a person civilly
 
committed in the absence of a showing of dangerousness to him
 
self or others, a right previously not recognized by the
 
courts. It also held that regardless of the grounds for civil
 
commitment, a person had a constitutional right to treatment
 
for his illness. O'Connor left no question as to where the
 
Court stood; "...a state officer could be charged with fore
 
seeing the unforeseeable despite apologetic statements of the
 
Court to the contrary."
 
Butz V. Economou (1978)
 
The Spalding-Barr precedents held that federal execu
 
tives were not personally liable for actions taken in the per
 
formance of their duties even if the actions violated an in
 
dividuals constitutional rights. In Bivens, however, the Sup
 
reme Court held federal narcotics agents personally liable
 
for actions which violated the defendants constitutional rights
 
The Supreme Court decision in Butz explains and spells
 
out the Bivens criteria and then applies them to a larger
 
class of federal officials. In Butz, the Court placed
 
federal executives personal liability squarely within the pre­
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cedents set in Scheuer and Wood. These section 1983 pre
 
cedents provide "greater detail for identifying a constitu
 
tional rights deprivation" and "for applying Court-mandated
 
principles in determining good faith and reasonable action
 
in a given set of circumstances." Most importantly, Butz
 
has expanded the number and type of administrators whose
 
immunity is no longer considered absolute. Following Butz,
 
the Supreme Court established an "absolute" immunity for
 
administrative officials exercising adjudicatory roles, in
 
cluding hearing examiners, administrative law judges, and
 
agency attorneys exercising prosecutional functions. Thus,
 
the Court decided that only where immunity is essential to
 
the proper performance of the job is one granted "absolute"
 
immunity.
 
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision stemmed from action
 
involving Arthur N. Economou, a commodities futures trader
 
with the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Commodity Ex
 
change Authority (CEA), and Earl Butz, then Secretary of Agri
 
culture. The law required the CEA to ensure that traders
 
maintained minimum capital balances and regularly reported
 
their financial status. A Department of Agriculture (DOA)
 
audit showed that Economou had not maintained the minimum
 
financial reserves prescribed by the department. As a result,
 
the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture issued an administra
 
tive complaint citing Economou for failing to comply with
 
regulations. Furthermore the complaint charged that Economou
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had willfully violated these regulations. Economou was then
 
ordered to show cause why his registration should not be
 
suspended or revoked. It was at this time that the CEA re
 
leased news of the action to the press.
 
A subsequent CEA audit revealed additional failures
 
on Economou *s part to maintain the minimum capital balances.
 
The second audit resulted in an amended complaint. As a
 
result, the DOA issued an administrative complaint to
 
"suspend or revoke" Economou's registration. The DOA's
 
chief hearing examiner sustained the department's complaint,
 
The DOA's chief legal officer later affirmed the hearing
 
examiner's decision a:nd suspended Economou's registration
 
for 90 days in 1973.
 
Economou asked for review, and the U.S. Court of
 
Appeals for the District of Columbia set aside the depart
 
ment's enforcement order. The Court's decision was based
 
upon the lack of a customary warning letter which might have
 
led Economou to correct the financial reserves problems.
 
Without the customary warning letter, any finding of "will­
fullness" on Economou's part, was found to be erroneous by
 
the court.
 
It was at this point that Economou sued Butz, the
 
hearing examiner, the department's chief legal officers, and
 
others "personally" for depriving him of his constitutional
 
rights. Economou, who argued that he had ceased trading
 
before the original complaint, essentially charged that
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officials took property froin him > his right to trade ­
without a warning letter. He contended i, among other things,
 
that the USDA had knowingly issued deceptive and false ,
 
preSs releases that had ruined his business V The press re
 
leases, he said, were in retaliation for his outspoken
 
criticism of the CEA an4 his efforts to push reform of the
 
agency *s procedures. Moreover, Economou claimed that the
 
DOA officials initiated the trading suspension to "chill"
 
his First Amendment, free expression rights since he had been
 
• '.v ■ ■ 28'' ■ ' ' 
a vocal critic of DOA commodity policymakers. 
Butz, and the other dependents claimed official im 
munity. They argued that action against Economou was with 
in their discretionary authority as department officials. 
The DOA officials relied on what they thought was settled 
law and invoked the doctrine of "discretionary duties", 
which they claimed satisfied the prerequisite for gaining 
protection against personal suit. The defendants claimed 
that only when an executive has "ministerial" duties or 
tightly defined duties which grant no leeway in making de­
cisions, could they lose the protective immunity. 
: The U.S. District court dismissed Economou's claim, 
stating that federal officials enjoy absolute immunity for ;:
 
all discretionary acts carried out within the scope of their
 
On appeal the court held that executive officials
 
do not have absolute immunity. The court based its deGislbn
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on the Civil Rights^ A^ of 1871. The Court of Appeals held
 
that the defendants were entitled only to a qualified im
 
munity, which would be available only if they established
 
that they had acted reasonabiy en'^ in good faith. In so
 
doing, the court of appeals refused to extend the absolute
 
immunity, available to judges and prosecutors in the judi
 
cial system, to their administrative counterparts, adminis
 
trative law judges and examiners.
 
Supreme Court Action ,
 
Butz and the other defendants appealed to the U.S.
 
Supreme Court. They again argued that "they were absolutely
 
immune from any liability for damages even if in the course
 
of enforcing the relevant statutes they infringed /Economou's/
 
constitutional rights and even if the violation was knowing
 
and deliberate. They contended that the broad immunity
 
was settled federal law. The court dismissed the defendant's
 
claim as "unsound". Moreover, the court pointed out that ,
 
the general rule has been that "a federal official may not
 
with impunity ignore the limitation which the controlling
 
law has placed on his powers".
 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice
 
White, removed the protection from personal suit and mone
 
tary damages which federal executives had enjoyed, saying
 
that federal officials and employees are not absolutely
 
immune from liability for injuries, if they deprive a person
 
of his constitutionally protected rights. ■ ■ 
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Finally, the Butz case clearly sets new limits on
 
the defenses available to officials, in particular high
 
ranking federal officials. In overturning the status quo
 
allowing officials with discretionary authority an absolute
 
immunity, the Supreme Court has forced officials to consider
 
more closely the decisions they make because they may be
 
forced to defend themselves in court. Although at least one
 
case in the circuit courts, Cruz v. Beto (1980), has placed
 
the burden of proving a federal official's neglect or dis
 
regard for constitutional rights on those allegedly injured,
 
the ability to go to court at all presents a revolutionary
 
change, forcing administrative officials to place official
 
liability high on their list of priorities.
 
Post Butz Judicial Activity
 
The succession of cases since the Butz decision has
 
confirmed and even widened the concept of public official's
 
personal liability. In Butz, an individual damage action
 
against officials of the Department of Agriculture was the
 
only avenue of relief available to Economou. In Davis v«
 
Passman (1979), a sex discrimination case, the court held
 
that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment provided
 
a remedy in damages. Davis v. Passman was similar to Butz
 
in that the court viewed an individual damage action as the
 
only means for satisfactorily solving the problem. This
 
factor appeared to be crucial to the court's decision to
 
grant relief against the individual defendant under the due
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process clause of the Fifth Amendment. This led to the
 
belief that the court was using the absence of an alternative
 
form of adequate relief as a prerequisite for a claim of in
 
dividual liability.
 
In 1980, however, the court, in Carlson v. Green
 
held that the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
 
clause could also serve as a basis for a civil suit for dam
 
ages against federal officials. In so doing, the court re
 
iterated the principles set forth in despite the fact
 
that ah alternative (the Federal Tort Claims Act) was avail
 
able to the injured party. In Carlson v. Green (1980), the
 
mother of an inmate who had died while in prison brought an
 
individual damage suit against federal prison officials
 
claiming that they had provided grossly inadequate medical
 
care for her son.
 
The claim could have been settled under the Tort
 
Claims Act, but the Court held that a personal damage suit
 
was proper. The Court stressed that the prospect of per
 
sonal liability acted as a strong deterrent because the
 
threat of personal liability suits would discourage federal
 
officials from engaging in unconstitutional conduct. More
 
over, the Court noted that a personal damage action afforded
 
greater relief to individuals who had suffered constitutional
 
injuries because punitive damages and jury trials, which are
 
32 .
 
not generally available, were authorized.
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Chapter 4
 
THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCE OF
 
THE PERSONAL LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
 
The most I significant argument in favor of the personal
 
liability of publie officials is that the constitutional
 
rights of the nation's citizens are more important than any
 
of the arguments I against officials* personal liability. In
 
addition, the poWer of the administrative officials has
 
occurred, so that a greater form Of accountability is neces
 
sary. Finally, |t is argued that making public administrators
 
personally liable for their actions will help deter these
 
administrators fipom acting in haste or using poor judgment in
 
decision making. I In other words, personal liability will
 
help reduce errors made by public administrator's.
 
In the interest of protecting individual citizens'
 
rights the Court;has turned its attention to the traditional
 
law regarding the immunity of administrative officials and
 
altered it, thus!allowing injured persons to recover damages
 
from individual administrators under certain conditions. This
 
system of reliefjhas not changed agency decisions or pro
 
cedures but still allows citizens who have been wrongly
 
harmed to seek sL'tisfaction through the Court system. While
 
■the price of thik approach has beeh paid in the coin of in­
' ' i ■ ■ . ■ ■ ' ' . ■ 
creased.case loads on the already crowded dockets and, some 
times, in ambiguity that makes administrative action 
difficult, in the area of immunity the court has contributed 
to the premise that "the sovereign of this Nation is the 
people, not the bureaucracy," by protecting the former without 
' sr' ■ ■■ ■ 
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■ ■ 'i" -1^ ■ . ■■ ■ ■ ' ■ ■ ■ 
crippling the latter. 
In a<3ditioh, many people are concerned with how, in 
the face of increasing bureaucratic power and influence, 
the citizen can ensure responsible administrative behavior 
by public officia|ls as they carry out their tasks as ser
 
vants Of the people. It is generally agreed that the people
 
want their public servants to act in innovative and imagina
 
tive ways in using discretion to implement public policies
 
that serve the public interest. However, the public official
 
must first consider the individual. The citizen must be
 
protected against actions by public officials who disregard
 
the person's basic constitutional rights. According to Ball,
 
"in this balancing effort it must not be forgotten that
 
■ ■ ■■ ■ . "■ . ' ■ „2
the citizen, not the public servant, is sovereign." 
Finally, it is argued that holding public officials 
personally liable for their actions serves as a deterrent to 
unconstitutional behavior and bureaucratic mistakes. For 
example, in Butz, the court espoused qualified immunity as a 
deterrent to wrongdoing, a method for preventing federal 
executives from discharging their duties with impunity or 
"in a manner which they should know transgresses a clearly 
established constitutional rule." This holds true for state 
and local administrators as well because the Butz decision 
places the law of immunity for federal officials alongside 
that of state and local officials, whose past experiences 
should give insight into the significance of the Butz 
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decision for federal officials.
 
In conclusion, it is clear that the courts have made
 
allowances for mistakes in judgment by public officials.
 
However, the emphasis places oh the protection of citizen's
 
rights remains equally clear* Officials have to consider the
 
possibility that if they disciiminate in their decisions,
 
they may be held personally liable and be successfully sued
 
in court. According to Rabin, "executives must add the area
 
of personal liability to the ever-increasing list of subjects
 
.,4

requiring their personal attention and training.
 
The past decade has seen a great increase in the per
 
sonal liability of local, state, and federal officials.
 
However, it can be argued that holding public administrators
 
personally liable for decisions is not the most effective
 
way to solve the problems that it is intended to solve.
 
Moreover, it is possible that this system could create serious
 
problems for the effective operation of the administrative
 
state.
 
There are significant problems connected with public
 
administrator's personal liability. First, will the citizen's
 
constitutional rights be protected? Second, will the offi
 
cials liability policy reduce the effective administration of
 
government policies? Third, will the policy deter official
 
misconduct? In conclusion, is holding officials personally
 
liable for their actions in the public interest? Let us
 
examine each of the questions individually.
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Will citizens' rights be protected?: It appears that
 
the official liability policy does reduce the ohanee risky
 
decisions being nade which cannot be defended with evidenGe
 
of good faith and reasohableness. The Court firmly believes
 
that litigation will tiean protection. The Cpurt has ru
 
against officiaie in cases involvihg the Fourth^ Fifth, and
 
Eighth amendment^ while leaving the pessibility open fQt
 
suits involving the rest of t^ first ^ How
 
ever, little evidence is available which suggests that V
 
citizens' rights are of greater concern today than before or
 
vice versa. One point does seem clear though; the victims
 
of uncdnstitutiojiai actions benefit little. Not only do most
 
public employees lack the financial resources to pay a judg
 
ment, but they also can defend most actions by asserting qua
 
lified immunity.j According to Dolan, "an employee proving
 
that his actions! were taken in good faith can escape liability
 
- a point of lav7' that explains that paucity of plaintiff re
 
coveries in Bivens actions." Moreover, in the case of
 
federal employees, the government can defend itself in Tort
 
Claims Act suits by asserting the good faith of its employees.
 
In view of the fact that'few public iempldyees can pa^^
 
stantial judgment, it seems highly debatable that the consti
 
tutional rights of citizens are better protected because of
 
recent court decisions holding public officials personally
 
liable for their actions.
 
Will the official liability policy reduce the effec­
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tive administration pf government policies? Goinirion sensp
 
leads one to believe that the threat of damage suits will make
 
officials more careful in their decision making. However, it
 
may have an additional, perverse effect as well. As Judge
 
Learned Hand observed in 1949, the fear of personal liability
 
may "dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or most
 
irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.
 
In today's judicial climate it is most probable that the types
 
Of litigation will increase. Hence, it is possible that the
 
problem of public officials backing off from risky, yet many
 
times necessary, decision making will also increase. Worse
 
still, as the Court argued in another context.
 
The most capable candidates for the public
 
service might be deterred from seeking
 
office if heavy burdens upon their private
 
resources from monetary liability were a
 
likely prospect during their tenure.^
 
The recent decisions of the court may inhibit the
 
effectiveness and efficiency of the public services. It is
 
argued some that the ultimate outcome of official's liability
 
may well be, that officials, faced with the possibility of
 
having to defend their many actions against the accusation of
 
acting in bad faith, will simply opt for the safest courses
 
of action,' ratheir than acting fearlessly and vigorously,
 
7 ^ 
 
"unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits.
 
Will officials' liability deter official misconduct?
 
Again it would appear that the threat of having to defend
 
oneself against a damage suit would have a deterrent value.
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The personal liability case carries with it a double threat;
 
punitive damages-financial penalties designed solely to
 
punish, as well as damages collected to compensate the victim
 
for injury. Some  empirical evidence suggests that tort reme­
dies have been eJEfective without adverse side effects in con­
8 '
 
trolling police behavior in Toronto. However, the deterrent
 
value of the personal liability policy depends on the pro­
bability that a jury will award damages. Evidence regarding
 
this subject is, as yet, sparse at best.
 
■ Many havre argued that the threat of personal liability 
suits is a quest:ionable method for deterring official miscon
 
duct. There are several reasons for this. As mentioned be
 
fore the method will have little deterrent value if juries
 
fail to grant adequate settlements. Only the certainty of
 
an adequate settlement will work as a deterrent. Other
 
methods of punishment, for instance, the threat of deductions
 
in pay, reprimand, suspension pr dismissal have been suggested
 
as better methods of deterrence. Moreover, the Court has
 
created a situation which may further complicate the deterrent
 
value of personal liability. The Court has not placed a
 
limit on the Constitutional amendments under which public ad
 
ministrators are liable to be sued. This "open forum" that
 
the Court now seems willing to provide will undoubtedly also
 
create uncertainty which will limit perspnal liability's
 
deterrent effect. This situation heeds to be clarified because,
 
as Miller states, "how can an act, not a constitutional vio­
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lation when committed, be deterred?" Finally, the vague 
terms which havel been used by the Court lend very little guid 
ance to public administrators as they attempt to carry out 
publiG policy in the manner they determine to be best. 
At this point it appears that there is insufficient 
evidence to determine whether or not personal liability suits 
will help to attain the goals of the current malpractice 
policy. The current trend toward the protection of citizen's 
constitutional rights may diminish public administrators' dis 
cretion. It may not act as a deterrent to official malfeas 
ance. Compensation may not be satisfactory to the injured 
party. 	At this point, only time will tell.
 
ALTERNATIVES TO PERSONAL LIABILITY
 
It is readily apparent that the current trend toward
 
increasing the personal liability of public administrators at
 
the local, state, and federal levels will continue. It has
 
also, however, been suggested that this method may be unac
 
ceptable as a way of protecting citizen's constitutional
 
rights without crippling or, at the least, hindering the
 
effective administration of the state. The growing number of
 
suits had prompted a resort to personal liability insurance
 
among certain federal officials (after the Butz decision),
 
but this type of insurance is now almost impossible to find,
 
due mainly to court ambiguity, and very expensive to ^
 
maintaih. bven|with insurance, it could be argued that
 
officials would|be more reluctant to make decisions v/hich
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involve the risk!of a suit. Moreover, the malpractice in
 
surance system h^s not been without its problems in other
 
professions, most notably the medical profession.
 
More and more people have recently suggested that
 
certain alternatives to the personal liability of public
 
administrators might possibly better meet the concerns
 
addressed by the Gourt in Butz, Bivens, and the remainder of
 
important couri^^^^^^b^^ have brought about current
 
policy. One such suggestion has led.the Department of Justice
 
to propose legisjlation to amend the federal Tort Claims Act.
 
Another suggestibn has been for the implementation of error-

reducing or riskj-management strategies by public agencies.
 
Finally, it has been argued that professional competency is
 
the best defense| against the threat of personal liability 
:suits. ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Recently proposed amendments to the Federal Tort
 
Claims Act may j^rovide an alternative method to the personal
 
liability dilemma of federal employees. The Department of
 
Justice estimates that several thousand so-called Biven's
 
suits have been jfiled since 1971.^^ Many of these suits are
 
filed on less than meritorious grounds. Federal employees,
 
however, are noi exposed to civil liability only through
 
Biven's suits. The Federal Tort Claims Act also waives the ,
 
government's so\?ereign immunity for tort claims based on the
 
negligent or wrongful act or omission of a federal employee
 
while acting within the scope of his office or employment.
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Although: the current Tort Claims Act does not cover
 
unconstitutional torts, a 1974 amendment extended the sta
 
tute's provisiohs to: "acts or; omissions of investigative
 
or law enforcemeint officers of the United States Government
 
/based on claims/ arising out of assault, battery, false
 
imprisonment, fdlse arrest, abuse of process, or malicious
 
12 I ' .

prosecution." | Except for certain special situations, how
 
ever, (mostly, involving drivers of goverment vehicles or
 
certain federal physicians), nothing in the Tort Claims Act
 
prevents citizeils from bringing suit against the federal
 
employee himself or as co-defendant with the government.
 
Although only seven of the several thousand Bivens
 
actions have ever resulted in a judgment against the federal
 
employee, (and Six of these seven cases are in varying
 
stages of appeal) the morale of the public service has
 
I ■ 13 ■ ■ ' 
nevertheless suffered. In addition, the victims of con
 
stitutional toirts benefit little from the current laws be
 
cause most federal employees lack the financial resources to
 
pay any judgment.
 
Therefore, it can be argued that the current law
 
makes little sense. The limited number of provisions making
 
the government |the exclusive defendant in Tort Claims Act,
 
cases presents inany inequities. For example, the driver of
 
a negligently driven government vehicle cannot be sued, but
 
the President can be exposed to personal liability for an act
 
of state such as transferring control of the Panama Canal.
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Employees can bo personally sued for the wrongful seizure of
 
any item except, for some inexplicable reasons, a sea-going
 
vessel. j
 
One obvious solution to this problem would be to make 
the U.S. government the exclusive defendant for both the 
constitutional a|hd common law torts of its emplpyees. In 
three of the last four Congresses the Department of Justice 
has proposed such an amendment to the Tort Claims Act, to no 
avail. - , ^ ' M- . ■ . 
The proposal made to the 96th Congress would make
 
the government tlhe exclusive defendant in common law tort
 
cases and expand the Tort Claims Act to cover constitutional
 
torts., If an employee was acting within the scope of his
 
office or emploipnent when the constitutional tort Was commit
 
ted, the United jstates would be the exclusive defendant. If
 
the ^ ployee was not acting within the scope of his office,
 
but was acting under the color of his office When the con
 
stitutional tort was coiknitted, the plaintiff could elect to
 
sue either the United States or the individual employee. The
 
government could not assert the qualified immunity of its
 
employees as a 4®f®nse to constitutional tort suits.
 
The disciplinary proceeding proposal has proved to
 
be the most controversial part of the legislation. The
 
Department of Justice has proposed that the victim of a con
 
stitutional tort be authorized to initiate an agency inquiry
 
into the actions of the offending employee if the victim has
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has obtained a monetary recovery agaihst the United States or
 
if he/she has aqtually filed a tort action against the United
 
1 C
 
States. A disciplinary hearing would be required xf there
 
were a materialiand substantial dispute of fact which could
 
be resolved with sufficient accuracy only by the introduction
 
of reliable evidence and the decision of the agency were
 
■ ■ I ' 16 ■ 
likely to depend On the resolution of such dispute. A com 
plainant who ha4 actually recovered damages against the gov
 
ernment on the constitution tort claim would have the right
 
of administrative review of the disciplinary action by, in
 
most cases, the|Merit System Protection Board. Judicial
 
review would be|taken by the appropriate United States Court
 
of Appeals. The American Civil Liberties Union and Public
 
Citizen represe|nt general public interest groups which argue,
 
with justificatiion, that if federal employees are in effect
 
to be immunizedi from suit, they should be exposed to some
 
type of accountability mechanism that provides for citizen
 
participation. | Employee groups, however, are reluctant to
 
allow non-gover|nment persons to participate in inquiries into
 
employee conduct;
 
Finally, the new legislation would raise the extent
 
of civil liability the government will be exposed to. Ob
 
viously, if th# government is to absorb the liability of its
 
employees, it will have to increase its liability exposure.
 
Consequently, the number of monetary recoveries against the
 
government will also increase. Yet, the legislation to amend
 
the Federal Tort Claims Act may provide a more effective solu­
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tion to the dilepuna of administrators liability and adminis
 
trative efficiency.
 
One poss|ible solution to the personal liability
 
problem which ha|s yet to be explored by any branch of the
 
government is rijsk-management. A risk-management program pro
 
vides a systematic effort for dealing with public liability
 
exposures. Offi|cials can initiate the management of lia
 
bility risks witih the adoption and announcement of a personal
 
liability polici^.
 
An organization which is concerned about liability
 
risks should have a coordinating unit responsible for risk-

management, everi if it lacks a formal policy. The Department
 
of Justice has t|.his responsibility in the federal government.
 
Other options mijght include a unit within the Office Of Man
 
agement and Budget or the Office of Personnel Management, or
 
a more decentralized, departmentalized approach.
 
State arid local governments, like the federal govern
 
ment, have no coordinating risk-management unit. Business
 
and industry, h(iwever, have had much success with their risk
 
management units. It has been argued that, perhaps, the
 
private sector with a profit motive is more concerned with
 
protecting their resources and that the public sector should
 
have similar concerns.
 
The first step in initiating the risk management pro
 
cess is to isolate potential liability risks. Almost every
 
activity can conceivably lead to liability suits. To identify
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liability risks,: government operations should be surveyed.
 
Federal officials might look at trends applicable to state
 
and local officiais' liability under 42 U.S. Code 1983. An
 
awareness of potjential risks can be used to explore further
 
which managemenii practices might create or increase the risk
 
of liability. ■ } 
Officials can then determine the frequency and
 
fihancial risks|of potential Wits in an effort to measure
 
liability risksy Complete and accurate records can be main
 
tained td determine the frequency and financial impact of the
 
various stilts. |This type of data base can be used to reduce
 
errors and suits. :
 
Beyond identifying and controlling some risks,
 
management efforts can reduce the chance of future liability
 
suits. Three methods appear feasible: constructing sound
 
practices for dealing with areas which create potential risks
 
or ones chronically creating loss; training employees in new
 
rules and procedures; and monitoring compliance with the pro
 
cedures so that early indicators of errant behavior surface
 
quickly and lead to corrective action—-a type of feedback
 
■ ■ ' . 17' ■ ■ I ■ ■ "' • 
system.
 
Finally, the federal government conducts little
 
training on personal liability risks while placing great
 
emphasis on rules and procedures to structure decisions. Of
 
course, rules can exclude legally required behavior as well
 
. ' i TO
 
as exclude legally permissible behavior. Thus, the lack
 
64 
of training on t:his topic v indicates possible areas for reform.
 
There is no perfject method for protecting both a citizen's
 
cohstitutidhal^ and a public employee against the
 
threat of personal liability suits. However, administrators
 
can build a natural buffer against personal liability when
 
they carry out their duties in good faith, act in a reasonable
 
and judicious malnner, and base their decisions on their skills
 
and training. |
 
CONCliUSION; THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE
 
The demhnd for increased accountability of public
 
officials and employees during the past decade suggests grow
 
ing concern amoijig citizens and elected officials alike with
 
the greater siz4 and power of modern bureaucracies. The rise
 
of the administrative State as well as the greater degree of
 
discretion afforded government employees has forced Congress,
 
the president, and individual citizens to make substantial
 
adjustments in Ithe face of bureaucratic power. The indivi^
 
dual's cause hap so far been championed almost exclusively by
 
the various courts, and in particular by the Supreme Court.
 
The Supreme Court's response to the rise of the administrative
 
state has been in the form of a succession of decisions which
 
have replaced the theory of absolute immunity of public
 
officials with [the theory of qualified or limited immunity.
 
In altering the traditional laW regarding the im
 
munity of administrative officials, the Court has presented
 
unconstitutibnailiy injured persons an opportunity to recover
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damageis from the individual agents of the administrative state 
■ ' I ' ' ■ 19 ^ ^ ■ 
under certain cqnditions. In this way, the Supreme Court
 
has allowed citizens to confront bureaucratic power directly
 
by affording individuals an opportunity to successfully
 
oppose administfators in court. This approach has increased
 
case loads in already crowded courtrooms and arguably made
 
administrative 4'^tion somewhat more difficult, however, it
 
has also given the individual citizen a way in which to de
 
fend his or her!constitutional rights against ill-used
 
bureaucratic power.
 
Public Administration has entered a riew era in Which
 
civil liabilityI comprises a major avenue of administrative
 
responsibility.i The past decade witnessed the emergence of
 
the theory of qualified immunity to replace the theory of
 
absolute immunity. Perhaps the next decade will witness
 
practical efforts for implementing the Court's new approach
 
by making it easier and less expensive to bring suit against
 
administrative bfficials while ihsuring that the citizen's
 
Victories are not empty because of minimal judgments or
 
administrators linability to pay. Or perhaps a mOre effective
 
system of protejcting individual's constitutional rights while
 
at the same tiitje insuring the smooth running of the adminis
 
trative state may be found. Only research on the issues
 
■ will'-,tell.'' ■■r' ■ ■ ■ 1 
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David H. Rdsenbloom, "Public Administrators* Official
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1 ^ ' Howard Bali, "Toward A Constitutional Law of Torts: The 
Burger Court and Official Liability," Southern Review of Pub 
lic Administration 6 (Spring 1982): 18. 
■ ' 3 ■ ' ■■ i ' -- ■ ■ ■■ ■ ■ ■Jack Rabin^ Gerald J. Miller, and W. Bartley Hildreth, 
"Suing Federal Executives For Damages", The Bureaucrat 7 
(Spring 1978): 54. 
'^Ibid., p. 54. 
^Gerald J. ikiller, "Administrative Malpractice Policy
Before and After Butz v. Economou," The Bureaucrat 9 
(Winter 1980-81): 31. 
^Ibid., p. 3l­
1 ■ ' . ' ' 
Barbara L. I Herwig, "The Government's View of Butz v. 
Conomou," The Bureaucrat 9 (Winter 1980-81): 24. 
8Gerald J. I4iller, "Administrative Malpractice Policy 
Before and Aftei Butz v. Economou," The Bureaucrat 9 
(Winter 1980-81i) : 31. 
®Ibid., p.J32. 
■ ■ 10 ■ ■ I ■■ ■ ■ . . ■Jack Rabini, Gerald J. Miller, and W. Bartley Hildreth, 
"Suing Federal Executives for Damages," The Bureaucrat 7 
(Spring 1978) : |5B. 
^^Michael W.I Dolan, "Government Employee Liability and the 
Federal Tort Claims Act," The Bureaucrat 9 (Fall 1980): 17. 
^^Ibid., p. |l8.
 
^^Ibid., p. jl8.
 
^^See 46 UJS.C. 745 (1976) 
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